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THE VIRTUE OF FAITH IN THEOLOGY, NATURAL
SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY
Kenneth W. Kemp

In this paper, I attempt to develop the account of intellectual virtues offered by
Aristotle and St. Thomas in a way which recognizes faith as a good intellectual
habit. I go on to argue that, as a practical matter, this virtue is needed not only
in theology, where it provides the basis of further intellectual work, but also in
the natural sciences, where it is required given the complexity of the subject
matter and the cooperative nature of the enterprise.

There are various ways in which a comparison and contrast between
theology, natural science, and philosophy can be made. It is instructive, for
example, to raise the question of whether, and if so to what extent, they
have a common object. Is there, in other words, any overlap with respect to
their subject matter? The possibility of overlap raises the possibility of conflict. To the extent that any of the overlapping disciplines uses probable
reasoning, there is a possibility that the conclusion that is most probable to
the practitioners of a given discipline on the basis of evidence currently
available to them will be inconsistent with the results of another discipline
based on probable reasoning from a different evidence base.
This is not, however, the only interesting basis for comparison and
contrast. The contrast of reason and faith as method, or even as cognitive
disposition is a common trope in discussions of science and religion. That
contrast figures prominently in atheistic polemics. 1 It is probably related to
the tendency to contrast the medieval Age of Faith" with the early modern Age of Reason."2 Suggestive of the connection, Louis L. Snyder, for
example, explicitly calls lithe age of reason" lithe age of faith in science"
[emphasis added] and says of this "great intellectual revolution":'
U

/I

Modern man, rejecting medieval theology as final authority, now
sought to interpret the universe, the world, and himself in terms of
reason and logical analysis.
These period labels are, however, at best misleading. Anyone who thinks
that reason and logical analysis figured more prominently in modern than
in medieval intellectual work would do well to compare the discussions of,
say, faith in Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary with that to be found in St.
Thomas' Summa Theologiae. Authors of potted intellectual history to the
contrary notwithstanding, the study of logic was a major component of
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medieval intellectual life. It was a tool that every medieval theologian was
required to study, and use. And in the early modern period, the value of
faith was recognized by most of the founders of modern science. Robert
Boyle, for example, left in his will £50 to establish a lectureship "for proving the Christian religion against notorious infidels." (The lecture series has
been continued to this day.) One can, to be sure, find many thinkers, particularly in the eighteenth century, who lack faith. Hume and Voltaire are
obvious examples. What is harder to find are medievals who lack respect
for reason. That lack of respect for reason is a feature not of the medieval
thinkers, but of their Romantic successors.
It is the thesis of this paper that any attempt to make a methodological
contrast between science and theology on the basis of the role of reason
and faith is misconceived and overstated. My project, however, is not to
undertake the essentially historical task of defending the remarks of the
previous paragraph. What I will do is rather to make a philosophical investigation. First, I will offer a definition of "faith". Then, I will say something
about the role of faith in theology, natural science, and philosophy.

1. What is Faith?
The best way to begin a discussion of faith is to get clear about the definition of the term and the best way to begin the project of definition is to
search for the genus.
William Ladd Sessions begins his study The Concept of Faith: A
Philosophical Investigation 4 by distinguishing six "models" of faith-personal relationship, belief, attitude, confidence, devotion, and hope. These models, he says, "highlight distinct, coherent sets of fundamental features
prominently exemplified in some group of conceptions of faith."s The purposes of this essay do not require that we find a concept so broad as to
include "faith in democracy" and the like. In what follows, I will sketch
what Sessions would call a particular conception of faith. Even within that
conception, there is no need to focus on every dimension and implication
of having faith. Since the topic of this paper is faith in various academic
disciplines, what is needed is merely the epistemic component of faith,
independent of how that is related to any other components (and independent of whether the epistemic component is focal or peripheral).
Consequently, I will begin this search for the genus of faith along the
lines laid down in some epistemological writings of Aristotle (primarily,
Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics) and of St. Thomas Aquinas (primarily,
the Treatise on Faith found in his Summa Theologiac). In the course of the
investigation I will, however, develop and modify what they have to say.
Since having faith means believing that certain things are true, faith is,
in the first instance, a habit or state of mind by which we have (or can
have) truth. I will argue later that it is a good habit or, in other words, an
intellectual virtue, a habit that makes human beings good with respect to
their minds. But first we must determine what particular habit of mind it is
and how it differs from other habits of mind.
Aristotle distinguishes two basic "parts" of the human mind: 6
"one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose originative causes

Faith and Philosophy

464

are invariable, and one by which we contemplate variable things."7 The
former he calls the epistemic part; the latter the deliberative or calculative
part. Aristotle goes on to distinguish three kinds of human activity which
display our character as intellectual beings-knowing, making, and doing.
Each of these activities is distinctively human; the ability to do each is
therefore a human perfection. The resultant virtues he assigns to the two
parts of the soul. Art (tekhne) and practical wisdom (phronesis) perfect the
deliberative-calculative part. The epistemic part is perfected by a set of
virtues which I will call, collectively, epistemic virtues. For simplicity, I will
focus on two of these epistemic virtues-nous and episteme." Each of these
virtues requires some comment. For each, we must identify a disposition
(the virtue itself), an activity, and a product.
Aristotle defines episteme as "a habit (hexis) of demonstration (apodeixis);"Y demonstration being syllogistic deduction from premises tl1at are true,
first, immediate, prior to and better known than, and cause of the conclusion.lO The product of demonstration can also be called episteme. Episteme,
then, is not just knowledge in the colloquial sense of a true belief. Nor is it
any justified true belief, for the justification has to be of a particular kind. It is
rather a knowledge grounded in more basic truths. Anyone who paid attention in school, perhaps, knows (i.e., correctly believes) that the area of the
square on the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the combined area of
the squares on the two other sides. But only the person who has studied
Euclid's Elements (or the equivalent) knows it in Aristotle's sense.
Aristotle recognized that he had to give an account of the epistemic
status of the premises of demonstrations. Some, of course, could themselves be the products of demonstration. But if all were, then anyone who
knew anything would have to know an infinite number of things, which
seemed unlikely. His alternative was that some propositions could be
known not by demonstration, but immediately. "Immediately" here meant
not "at first hearing" but rather "not on the basis of demonstration."
If this account is to work, Aristotle must give an account of a habit of
mind by which, given sufficient experience of the world, we recognize the
truth of some propositions. Aristotle believed that we could have such a
habit. He called it nOLlS, which is sometimes translated "intuition." Its operation he called induction (epagoge); its product, principles (arkhai). The
Postulates of Euclid, e.g., that [on a Euclidean plane] any line can be
extended indefinitely in either direction, or his Common Notions, e.g., that
when equals are added to equals the results are equal, would be examples.
Aristotle's account of epistemic virtues, as developed so far, can be
summarized as follows:

Habit
nous
[intuition]
episteme [knowledge]

Operation (Act)
epagoge [inductionl
apodeixis [demonstration]

Product
arkhai [principles]
episteme [knowledge]

This list of states or habits of mind is not complete. Indeed Aristotle
recognizes this, for immediately after giving his list of intellectual virtues ll
he adds, "we do not include judgment and opinion because in these we
may be mistaken." St. Thomas, on this, as on so many other topics, pre-
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sents a fundamentally Aristotelian account. But since, unlike Aristotle, he
had to give an account of faith, he provides a slightly more elaborate
account here. He distinguishes three states in which there is less evidence
than is necessary to compel assent-doubt, suspicion, and opinion. That
one might doubt the truth of some proposition one did not know to be
false, or that one might hold as one's opinion a proposition that one did
not know (in the strict sense) to be true, is easy to understand. But what is
suspicion? Unfortunately, the term is somewhat Janus-faced in English.
One the one hand, a traditional attribution of a work to a famous author
may be called, by the revisionists, "suspect." On the other hand, the police
call someone whom they think committed the crime "the suspect." It is the
second facing, "suspicion" of truth, that we need here. The first facing is
equivalent to doubt. Suspicion of truth, however, falls short of belief; a
policeman who suspects the butler might not be ready to say that, in his
opinion, the butler did it. Suspicion, in the sense defined, has an important
role to play in science, as can be seen in the following sketch of a line of
physiological research pursued by Ernst Heinrich Weber:12
Weber determined that the just noticeable difference (. .. jnd) for
weight discrimination-that is, the minimum amount of difference
between two weights necessary to tell them apart-was always an
amount equal to 1/30th of the heavier of the weights being compared. Weber observed similar regularities for other kinds of sensory
discriminations-though the specific fraction for the jnd differed for
each sense. In comparing the length of lines ... the jnd was always
about 1/100th... , For musical pitches, the jnd seemed to be about
1/16lth of the vibrations per second. Weber suspected, though he did
not prove, that a constant factor could be determined for all the other
senses as well. [Emphasis added.]
"Suspicion," then, is the state that a scientist has with respect to working
hypotheses. All three of these states are contrasted with scientia and intellectus (St. Thomas' names for Aristotle's nous and episteme).13 Both Aristotle
and St. Thomas argue that opinion, by which they mean beliefs that, however much evidence there may be for them, are not the product of intuition
or demonstration, is not an intellectual virtue, since it does not preclude
the possibility of error.
Aristotle restricts nous and episteme to necessary truths and to truths
about universals (kinds of things, in contrast to particular individuals). In
doing so, however, he leaves at the margins of his taxonomy many important aspects of the intellectual life. Aristotle believed that episteme was possible in mathematics, metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. Many modern authors, even some generally sympathetic to Aristotle/ 4 are less sanguine. It is arguable, but a minority position, that he thought it was possible
in ethics. 15 He surely did not think it was possible in history, since all historical truths are contingent. His criteria require us to make the same judgment
about most of modern natural science, since the best results of modern science--evolutionary theory, Mendelian genetics, the atomic theory of matter, etc.-are accepted because they are the best explanation of the phenom-
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ena so far observed, not because their principles are self-evident. 16
We need, therefore, a richer account of the human intellectual life, one
that will be more explicit about the knowledge of particulars as well as
about contingent truths. There are, I will suggest, two sets of analogs of
IZOUS and episteme.
The first set of analogs focuses on the use of our natural powers in
ways that fall short of nous and episteme. Some aspects of our intellectual
life, including all of modern science, depend upon our having the ability to
make observations and to carry out probable reasoning (in particular, generalization and argument to the best explanation). Successful observation
and probable reasoning require skill. One has to recognize one's good
observations and set aside one's bad ones. Similarly, there is a skill in distinguishing better from worse explanations. Given the multiplicity of
desiderata in a good theory-accuracy, consistency, coherence, simplicity,
elegance, scope, fertility '7-one must develop an eye for when a theory's
elegance or scope is great enough to allow for some inaccuracy. Insofar as
having these skills allows us to form well-grounded opinions about matters with respect to which, for the time being or even in principle, episteme
is impossible, they improve our intellect. They are, therefore, virtues.
The second set of analogs is, inchoately, noticed by Aristotle himself,
who writes: 'R
We ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of
experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom not
less than to demonstrations; for, because experience has given them
an eye, they see aright.
We cannot know everything we need to know on the basis of our own
intellectual work. Sometimes we may lack the intuitional or observational
basis which underlies the knowability of certain truths. Are there really
planets beyond Saturn? Those who do not have access to large telescopes
must take it on faith that there are, at least until they can check it out for
themselves. Had John F1amsteed, Tobias Mayer, Pierre Charles Le Mounier
and others really seen Uranus unawares in the years before William
Herschel's 1781 discovery? This was an important question because, if
their observations were accurate, Uranus was not following the course prescribed for it by Newton's Laws. Here, of course, there's no checking it
out. Although Alexis Bouvard 19 attempted to dismiss the prediscovery
observations as inaccurate, most astronomers accepted the observations
and worried about the discrepancy. Their faith in the earlier observers led
to the discovery of Neptune. At other times, we may lack the mathematical
skill necessary to work out a conclusion for ourselves. Did Uranus' position in the early nineteenth century really deviate from where Newton's
theory plus the prediscovery observations put it? Surely most historians of
science trust the work of the nineteenth century calculators without doing
the calculations for themselves. They take it on faith that this is so.
These two limitations force recognition of yet more epistemic virtues.
Analogous to nous and observation there is trust in others, or faith.
Analogous to episteme and probable reasoning, is skill in the interpretation of
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what others said.
Having faith is a peculiar intellectual virtue in that it has two objectsthe personal object/ in whom the subject has faith, and the propositional
object, which the subject believes as a result of that faith.
The virtue of faith bears an interesting similarity to the moral virtues.
Aristotle defines the moral virtues in two ways. One definition contrasts
them with intellectual virtues-moral virtues are habits which perfect the
will. Another contrasts them with moral vices-moral virtues are habits of
choosing the mean. 21 This latter definition does not seem to apply to nous or
episteme. In their exercise, no choice is involved. st. Thomas, however, recognizes that faith is a matter of will as well as reason. 22 The same can be said
about the virtue that makes probable reasoning possible-one must decide
that the proper standard of evidence is met, and one must decide how rigorous a standard is relevant to the matter at hand. c3 For that reason, Aristotle's
second definition applies to faith (and the virtue connected to probable reasoning)-faith is a mean between the extremes of gullibility and excessive
scepticism. It is a virtue when it is a habit of making the right choice with
respect to belief.
Aristotle's conception of faith is a natural faith of the kind that one
human being might have in another. St. Augustine recognizes a qualitative
similarity between natural faith and faith in God in The City of God:"'
11

If we attain the knowledge of present objects by the testimony of our

own senses, whether internal or external, then, regarding objects
remote from our own senses, we need others to bring their testimony,
since we cannot know them by our own, and we credit the persons to
whom the objects have been or are sensibly present. Accordingly, as
in the case of visible objects which we have not seen we trust those
who have (and likewise with all sensible objects), so in the case of
things which are perceived by the mind and spirit, i.e., which are
remote from our interior sense, it behooves us to trust those who have
seen them set in that incorporeal light, or abidingly contemplate them.
St. Thomas' discussion of faith, by contrast, is focused almost exclusively
on the theological virtue of faith in God, although he does at one point
mention "faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for."25 We have, nevertheless, reached, by a different path,
the definition of St. Paul-"faith is the evidence of things not seen"26-and
that of St. Thomas-"faith is a habit of the mind ... making the intellect
assent to what is not apparent."":
Having suggested, in these last paragraphs, that faith is not only a
habit of mind, but one that will get us to some truths that would otherwise
be inaccessible to us, I have gone some way to showing that faith is a good
habit, a virtue. This is a topic to which I will return in the following sections, where I will discuss the importance of faith in theology and in the
natural sciences.
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2. Faith ill Theology

Theology can be defined in either of two ways-as a discipline and as a
subject matter. As a subject matter, it is exactly what the etymology of the
term suggests-an account of God. That account might be developed solelyon the basis of natural reason (hence, natural or philosophical theology),
or on the basis of revelation. The existence of revelation and its distinctness
from all natural methods of acquiring knowledge makes possible a second
definition of theology-the science (i.e., organized body of knowledge)
based upon revealed truth.28 St. Anselm put the point slightly differently:
theology is fides quaerens intellectum-faith seeking understanding. It is this
second sense in which the term "theology" will be used in this paper.
The fact that theology, unavoidably and by its very nature, begins
with revelation-truths accepted by faith-makes it different from all
other sciences.
Revelation, according to St. Thomas, is useful for two reasons: 2" First,
there are some truths necessary to our salvation which are beyond the reach
of unaided human reason. Second, even those truths necessary to salvation
which are not in principle beyond the reach of human reason are often difficult to attain-"knowable only to a few, and that after long study." Making
salvation available to all requires that these truths be revealed.
The fact that theology is grounded in revelation does not, of course,
mean that there is nothing for theologians to do other than to repeat those
truths. Since not all revelation is propositional in character, they must use
their interpretive skills to draw propositions from the stories, poems, and
myths of Scripture as needed in the light of new controversies. Revealed
propositions provide the foundation for a variety of kinds of work.
Theologians can seek proofs for those revealed truths that are also knowable by reason. They can seek probable arguments for any revealed truth.
They can answer objections to revealed truths. They can draw conclusions
from the revealed principles, either alone or in combination with propositions known by reason alone. And they can attempt, in various ways, to
draw the various propositions known by revelation into a systematic structure. 30 John Henry Cardinal Newman made this point as follows: 31
Reason ... is subservient to faith, as handling, examining, explaining,
recording, cataloguing, defending the truths which faith, not reason,
has gained for us, as providing an intellectual expression of supernatural facts, eliciting what is implicit, comparing, measuring, connecting each with each, and forming one and all into a theological system.
Revealed truth, according to St. Thomas provides the highest possible
degree of certainty.32
A man of little science is more certain about what he hears on the
authority of an expert in science, than about what is apparent to him
according to his own reason. And much more is a man certain about
what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than about what
he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.
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Such certainty does not, however, extend to all aspects of theological work.
A Christian's certainty about the fact that God is omniscient does not provide certainty with respect to any particular account of how God can have
knowledge of free human actions that have yet to be performed.
3. Faith in Natural Science

Natural science, like philosophy, mathematics, history and all other disciplines except theology, does not begin with revealed truths. Does faith play
any role in the doing of natural science?
Some fundamentalists, particularly in the heat of their battle with scientists over evolution, have insisted that it does. Richard B. Bliss, for example, once wrote: "For the past 100 years, Darwin's ideas have become a notto-be-challenged by word of science."33 This theme has been picked up by others. In his introduction to a modern edition of Darwin's Origin of Species, L.
Harrison Matthews states: 3.
The fact of evolution is the backbone of biology, and biology is thus
in the peculiar position of being a science founded on an unproved
theory-is it then a science or a faith? Belief in the theory of evolution
is thus exactly parallel to belief in creation-both are concepts which
believers know to be true but neither, up to the present time, has
been capable of proof.
Both of these comments are, however, mistaken. Although Darwin's
thesis that species originated by descent with modification from one or a
few first kinds of organisms quickly won wide acceptance among scientists, his thesis that modification was a result of natural selection was not
accepted until the development of the "new synthesis" (of Darwinism and
Mendelism) in the 1930's.
The two "beliefs" are by no means parallel. Biologists accept Darwin's
theory of evolution for the same reason they accept any other explanation-because it is the best explanation of a wide array of observed facts. Is
that proof? That depends, of course, on what one means by "proof". It is
not the kind of proof one finds in mathematics, viz., deduction from principles. Evolutionary biology, then, like most of the rest of modern science,
does not meet the high standards set by Aristotle. But in the more modest
sense of "proof" (Sc., testing), it is provable--it withstands the test of new
discoveries.
Evolutionary theory is accepted by biologists on the basis of ordinary
evidence, not on the basis of faith. Would those who are looking for faith in
scientific work have done better had they looked elsewhere?
The kind of thing that authors like Matthews seem to be looking forpropositions that are accepted without evidence--can be found in science.
One place where such propositional acceptance may be found is in the
commitment some scientists show to the metaphysical principles that
underlie certain research programs. William James once wrote, but not
with particular reference to scientific research: 35
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Not a victory is gained, not a deed of faithfulness or courage is done,
except upon a maybe; not a service, not a sally of generosity, not a
scientific exploration or experiment or textbook, that may not be a
mistake .... And often enough our faith beforehand in an uncertified
result is the only thing that makes the result come true . ... [In an enormous class of cases], the part of wisdom as well as of courage is to
believe what is in the line of your needs, for only by such belief is the
need fulfilled.
Maya scientist do that? Emil Ou Bois-Reymond, one of the founders of
the mechanistic research program in physiology, wrote in a letter:'"
Brucke and I pledged a solemn oath to put in power this truth: No
other forces than the common physical-chemical ones are active within the organism. In those cases which cannot at the time be explained
by these forces one has either to find the specific way or form of their
action by means of the physical mathematical method, or to assume
new forces equal in dignity to the chemical physical forces inherent in
matter, reducible to the force of attraction and repulsion.
Commenting on this passage, psychologist and historian Raymond
Fancher says, "Mechanism became an article of faith among [Ou BoisReymond and his colleagues]."'? Committing themselves to mechanism in
this way does not seem to have interfered with the doing of good science.
Ou Bois-Reymond did excellent work on animal electricity. The same commitment led Hermann Helmholtz to such important results as the conservation of energy and a measurement of the speed of nerve impulses. The
metaphysical principles to which these scientists committed themselves are
by no means necessary to the discoveries they made. No one who accepts
their conclusions need accept their metaphysical opinions, since these
opinions did not function as premises in their arguments. But as a psychological matter, those opinions may have encouraged them to undertake
lines of research which their methodologically mechanist but metaphysically vitalist teacher Johannes Muller had set aside.
In other scientific work, unsecured opinions do serve as premises.
Consider the argument for the claim that the universe is expanding. That
argument begins with an empirical law based on observational work done
by V. M. Slipher, Edwin Hubble and Milton Humason in 1912-1929:
(1)
Hubble's Law:'" Galaxies outside the local group recede from
the earth at a speed proportional to their distance.

Obviously
(2) If the universe is homogeneous and isotropic [i.e., is everywhere and in every direction the same], then every observer in the
universe finds other galaxies moving away from them at a speed proportionate to their distance from the observer.
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It can be shown that

(3) If every observer in the universe finds other galaxies moving
away from them at a speed proportionate to their distance from the
observer, then the universe is expanding.
These premises will yield the now-accepted cosmological conclusion-that
the universe is, in fact, expanding-only if one adds as a premise the
antecedent of P2:
(4)
The Cosmological Principle: The universe is homogeneous and
isotropic.

But what evidence can be offered for that premise? Surely not observational
evidence, for no observers we know have ever been any place outside the
solar system. University of Massachusetts physicist Edward R. Harrison
says, "we must postulate the cosmological principle as an article of faith .... ,n'!
Those who accept evolutionary cosmology as good science have two
options at this point. They can either marshal some kind of argument for
the cosmological principle or offer an account of why some sciences may
legitimately proceed on the basis of unsecured premises. It does not matter
for our purposes which of these options they choose.
What is important for our purposes is rather the recognition that the
concept of faith of those who see this as a matter of faith is an impoverished one. What the argument for the expansion of the universe includes
(and what the arguments for Darwinism are said to include) are premises
which are believed to be true even though there seems to be no evidence
for them. Accepting premises for which no evidence can be given, whether
legitimate or not, is not faith. There is no personal object. When St. Paul
commends the faith of Biblical heroes from Abel to the prophets in Hebrews
11, he is not commending them for believing something arbitrarily. The
faith he commends is their faith in God. Faith is not belief for no reason whatever; it is belief on the basis of authority. Medieval authors sometimes characterized this distinction as believing on the basis of what one sees (science) and believing on the basis of what one hears (faith).
We can set aside then as irrelevant to the subject under discussion the
kind of confidence that some scientists show in their hunches, working
hypotheses, or research programs. The myth that scientists are Cliffordian
rigorists, carefully apportioning their confidence in the truth of a proposition to their evidence for it was exploded by the work of Thomas Kuhn,
Imre Lakatos and others. As the title of one of his early articles ("The
Function of Dogma in Scientific Research"4") suggests, Kuhn thinks that
such confidence is not a mark against the scientific enterprise. None of
these are cases in which a scientist's confidence is (at least not per se)
grounded in any confidence in someone else's judgment. They are not,
therefore, matters of faith.
Faith does, nevertheless, playa role in scientific work. It is obvious that
an introductory student must take much on faith. Consider the electron
micrographs which illustrate chapters on cell biology in all the standard
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textbooks. That these granules are starch molecules, or that those microfibrils are bundles of cellulose strands, the student must take on faith.
This is true of the specialist as well. First, a scientist exhibits trust in his
reliance on the instruments he uses. How well does the typical biologist
understand the physical principles of electron micrography?
Second, scientists trust their fellow scientists to do good work and to
report their results honestly. This trust is not, of course, unlimited.
Scientists live by Ronald Reagan's favorite Russian proverb-"Trust, but
verify." They attempt to replicate the work of others. But not every scientist undertakes the replication. Some do; the rest trust the replica tors.
Sometimes replication is too costly to be practical.
Worse, sometimes replication is impossible in principle. That is the
case in some parts of observational, but non-experimental, sciences, such as
astronomy. Here is Sir Edmund Halley's case for the periodic nature of
cometary appearances:,j
There are many things which make me believe that the Comet which
Apian observ'd in the Year 1531, was the same with that which Kepler
and Longomontanus more accurately describ'd in the Year 1607; and
which I myself have seen return, and observ'd in the Year 1682. All of
the Elements [of the orbit] agree, and nothing seems to contradict this
my opinion, besides the Inequality of the Periodic revolutions. Which
Inequality is not so great neither, as that it may not be owing to
Physical Causes .... And I am the more confirmed in my opinion of its
being the same; for that in the Year 1456, in the Summer time, a Comet
was seen passing Retrograde between the Earth and the Sun, much
after the same manner: Which tho' nobody made observations upon
it, yet from its Period and the manner of its Transit, I cannot think different from those I have just now mention'd. And since looking over
the Histories of Comets I find, at an equal interval of Time, a Comet to
have been seen about Easter in the Year 1305, which is another double
Period of 151 Years before the former.
These observations, crucial as they were to the argument, obviously could
not be checked by Halley or his contemporaries. His claim gained more
support, to be sure, when the comet reappeared in 1758-9, as Halley had
predicted. But the periodicity of comets was accepted before that confirmation. The reports might be dismissed if they were inconsistent with other
available data: 2 Halley does not worry about the absence of a report from
about 1381. Whether this is a problem or not depends on the thoroughness
of fourteenth century astronomical reports.
Although scientists must have faith in their colleagues if science is to
advance, this faith need not be unlimited. It extends more readily to acceptance of raw scientific data than to acceptance of the conclusions a scientist
draws from those data. D. C. Miller spent much of the 1920's, when he was
president of the American Physical Society, attempting to measure the
aether wind caused by motion of the earth through the aether.43 (It was the
failure of Michelson and Morley to measure this effect that provided
strong logical, if not historical, support for Einstein's Special Theory of
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Relativity.) Almost no one accepted Miller's claims to have measured the
aether wind, though most did recognize the importance of explaining why
Miller was getting the results he got. No one thought he was making them
up. Incompetence and fraud do, nevertheless, occur in science and dismissing the evidence of others is not ruled out in principle."'
There are, to be sure, differences between the faith scientists have in
one another's work and the theologian's faith in God. First, the faith of the
scientist in other researchers is provisional and limited by plausibility constraints. Scientists were sceptical of the claims about cold fusion. And, in
the late nineteenth century, they were sceptical of reports of sea-serpent
sightings, even from experienced sea captains and scientists. The faith of
the theologian in God, by contrast, is unlimited.
Second, although any given scientist must rely, for much of what he
believes, on faith in other scientists, the scientific community, as a whole,
does not have to have faith in any non-human or supernatural beings.
Science is, that is to say, a purely human enterprise.
But while both of these differences are real, neither is relevant to the
question of what habits of mind count as intellectual virtues for scientist or
theologian. Faith must always be proportioned to the one in whom the
faith is placed. Experienced observers should be trusted further than amateurs. Was a golden eagle really observed in a Minnesota state park?
Golden eagles are relatively uncommon in Minnesota and immature bald
eagles are easy to mistake for golden eagles. We will accept the report of an
expert bird watcher much more readily than that of picnicker with a copy
of Peterson's on the shelf at home. Christian theologians believe that there is
someone (namely, God) who is omniscient and honest and therefore trustworthy even in the matter of otherwise incredible things. They believe that
we will rise from the dead on the last day, not because there is any direct
evidence for it, but because there is evidence that God exists and that he
promised us that we will do so. The difference between one who believes
in the general resurrection and one who does not need not be a difference
in any habit of mind (e.g., presence or lack of faith). It is rather a difference
in factual beliefs-whether God exists and whether he made any such
promise.
One does not need merely provisional faith in all persons (including
God) to do science. Nor does one need to believe that a completely human
enterprise is the only intellectual enterprise worth pursuing. There is thus
no basis for any claims that the habits of mind required for doing theology
(or being a faithful Christian) are in tension with those required for doing
science. The contrast between the man of faith and the man of science is a
false contrast.

4. Faith in Philosophy
Philosophy, like theology, can be defined in different ways. In accordance
with its etymology, it might be defined as a "love of wisdom." Aristotle
defined wisdom as "/lOUS combined with episteme of the highest objects."4'
Consequently, when St. Justin Martyr's long search for wisdom culminated
in his conversion to Christianity, he did not think that his discovery that
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the access to the highest truths depended on revelation (i.e., could not be
had by natural means alone) made him any less a philosopher.
In contrast with Justin's etymological definition stands the definition
of St. Thomas Aquinas. He opens the Summa Theologiae by asking
"whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?//46 By philosophy he means all (and only) that knowledge which is built up by
human reason. The importance of St. Thomas to subsequent Catholic
thought has led to the widespread acceptance of this definition by many
Christian, as well as secular, philosophers, though the term has subsequently been narrowed to exclude the natural and social sciences.
Relying on the Thomistic definition, appropriately contracted, then,
philosophy is like natural science and unlike theology. There are two causes (neither having anything to do with a residual Justinism) of the popular
failure to recognize this fact.
The first is the existence of natural theology-the attempt to prove the
existence of God by reason alone (i.e., philosophically). It is a doctrine of
the Catholic faith (taught by the First Vatican Council) that God //can be
known with certainty with the natural light of human reason by means of
the things that have been made.// 47 Many people, both Catholic and nonCatholic, have been interested in whether and how this might be done.
The second cause is recent trends in modern theology, in particular the
loss of faith and the decline in standards of logical rigor. There are certain
topics, e.g., transubstantiation or the Incarnation, which only arise among
those who have faith and can only be discussed in detail by those who
have had a good philosophical formation. The decline in discussion of
these questions among theologians has led to an increase in discussion of
them by Christian philosophers. Students with an interest in and aptitude
for discussion of these questions are drawn to the philosophy departments
where they are being discussed, reinforcing the tendency of these questions to be discussed in philosophical circles. This work may be poaching,
but it should be judged on its merits. It should also, however, be clearly
distinguished from Thomistically-defined philosophy.
If supernatural faith does not play any role in securing the premises of
philosophical arguments, does natural faith nevertheless play at least some
role in philosophy, as it does in natural science?
On the whole, it does not. There are, to be sure, certain areas of philosophy where one philosopher must depend on the work of others. The
salient example is in the history of philosophy.
What exactly did Descartes mean in some of the less clear passages of
his work? On April 16, 1648, Franz Burman, a 20-year-old student in
Leyden, had a chance to dine with Descartes and to put to him a whole
series of questions about those difficult passages. A few days later, Burman
wrote down Descartes' answers to his questions. Since its rediscovery at
the end of the nineteenth century, The Conversation with Burman has been
considered invaluable by Descartes scholars. But without faith in Burman's
honesty, the document is of no value.
This faith in one's sources is by no means uncritical. Both Plato and
Xenophon were personal friends of Socrates. But even setting aside some
dialogues as not aimed at presenting the historical Socrates, the differences
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between the portraits drawn by the two authors are sufficient to require
caution in relying too heavily on either author. Plato is perhaps too original
a thinker to be a reliable biographer; Xenophon, perhaps, too literal-minded to appreciate Socrates' originality. Limited faith is appropriate for
authors with limitations (which means for all human authors).
Nevertheless, this role for faith in philosophical work is fairly strictly
circumscribed. In non-historical philosophical work reliance on the work of
others is rather less readily accepted. One is, in general, expected to layout
one's own arguments. Citations there are, to be sure, but their proper role
is to give credit, not to establish truth.
Two reasons might be suggested as to why this is true. The first is that
philosophy is a discipline in which such consensus as there is is diachronic,
not synchronic. Questions are seldom closed; most propositions need to be
argued for. The second is that philosophy differs from natural science in
that the latter is based on special experience; the former on experience that
is common to us all. 48
Darwin's theory of evolution depends on extensive and specialized
experience with a wide variety of organisms. Some of the experiences were
his own-he bred pigeons to get a deeper understanding of artificial selection; he traveled around the world in the Beagle and made careful observations every place he could. But a general theory needs as wide an evidential base as possible. For much of his evidence he had to rely on the investigations of others.
Purely philosophical projects do not, in general, rely on such special
experience. Philosophical investigations into, say, the relation between language and the world build on the general phenomena of human language.
To the extent that it begins to be relevant, say, how the Hopi say things,
one is no longer doing philosophy of language, one is doing linguistics.
There are, to be sure, exceptions, such as philosophical reflection on quantum mechanics, where the philosopher (as philosopher) depends on the
special experience of scientists. However, to the extent that philosophy
does rely on evidence that is available to us all, there is no need to rely on
the authority of others.

5. Conclusion.
The often-heard claim that the scientific and the theological approach to
knowledge are sharply different creates serious misunderstanding. While
it is true that theology is grounded in revelation and science is not, as a
practical matter the practitioners of each discipline require the intellectual
virtue of faith. The difference in their reliance on and confidence in faith
does not show any difference in the habits of mind appropriate to each discipline. It is a result merely of the fact that the source which provides help
to the theologian-God-is more reliable than any extrinsic aid available to
the scientist.
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1.
See, for example, Tad S. Clements, Science vs. Religion (Prometheus,
1990).
2.
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Hebrews 11:1.

27. 2a2re, Q. 4, a. 1. The omitted phrase "whereby eternal life is begun in
us" applies only to the theological virtue of faith, which is St Thomas' nearly
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28. la, Q. 1, aa. 1-8.
29. la, Q. 1, a. 1.
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precise, he does offer an alternative-the cosmological principle can be derived
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